How Should We View the Dissolution Order Against the Former Unification Church? (Part 2)
A Dissolution Order That Contradicts Legal Fairness — The Risk That Many Other Religious Organizations Could Also Meet the Same Criteria
Seishiro Sugihara, Former Professor at Musashino Women’s University
Introduction
On March 25, the Tokyo District Court issued a dissolution order against the religious corporation known as the “Family Federation for World Peace and Unification” (formerly the Unification Church; hereinafter referred to as “Family Federation”). This decision egregiously disregards the purpose and principles of the Religious Corporations Act and represents a reckless misuse of judicial authority. In this paper, I will examine why this order is so problematic from both legal and constitutional perspectives, and why such a decision should never be tolerated in a nation governed by the rule of law, especially given the potential implications for other religious organizations.
The Dissolution Order Procedure Is Unconstitutional and Not Envisioned by the Religious Corporations Act
Article 81, Paragraph 1 of the Religious Corporations Act stipulates that a religious corporation may be dissolved only when it has committed acts that “violate laws and regulations and are clearly recognized as significantly harming public welfare.” The inclusion of terms such as “significantly” and “clearly” indicates that the law intends for dissolution orders to be issued only in the most exceptional of cases. This intention is evident even from the legislative process that produced the Act, which sought to protect religious autonomy by limiting government interference.
For this reason, the decision is not left to the sole discretion of the Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, who is the supervisory authority, but rather the matter is first submitted to deliberation by the Religious Corporations Council, and then the court, as a judicial institution, confirms the appropriateness of the decision and issues a dissolution order.
Judicially, the procedure is treated as a non-contentious matter—an administrative act conducted by a judicial body. Because of this classification, it can be handled behind closed doors and does not require a public trial.
However, this means that a dissolution order—tantamount to the “death penalty” for a religious corporation—can be issued without a public hearing, in violation of Articles 32 and 82 of the Constitution of Japan, which guarantee the right to access courts and public trials. This is a blatant constitutional violation and constitutes an unacceptable act under international legal standards.
In fact, a proper dissolution order can only be issued when a religious corporation has been found guilty of criminal conduct through a public trial, where the dissolution grounds are undeniably clear to all. On that basis, the MEXT Minister consults with the Religious Corporations Council and then petitions the court, which confirms that the grounds are substantiated and issues the dissolution order.
In civil matters, the standard must be as follows: when there are multiple final and binding judgments in civil court repeatedly determining that certain actions are illegal, and the MEXT Minister, as the supervisory authority, issues a corrective recommendation, yet the illegal conduct continues and such court rulings persist, only then may MEXT petition the court for a dissolution order based on those judgments.
It is under these specific conditions—and only with such confirmed judicial findings—that the court may proceed with a non-contentious hearing and ultimately issue a dissolution order.
By contrast, in the current case, MEXT collected victim reports submitted by individuals identifying themselves as victims and submitted these as evidence to the Tokyo District Court. The court, in turn, based its decision on these reports alone and issued the dissolution order. This procedure is fundamentally at odds with the basic premise of the Religious Corporations Act and constitutes a violation of constitutional due process.
The principle of public trials exists to ensure judicial fairness through direct public oversight. If it becomes known internationally that a religious corporation in Japan was dissolved without a public trial, the country will undoubtedly face global criticism.
The Dissolution Order Was a Prejudiced and Unjust Application of the Law
As previously noted, civil cases may serve as grounds for the dissolution of a religious corporation—but only when they involve legally recognized “torts” as defined under Article 709 of the Civil Code. A tort occurs when a person suffers damage and then files a claim for compensation against the alleged perpetrator. Since not all forms of civil misconduct can be codified in advance, such claims are judged on a case-by-case basis. Only when a court determines that damage has occurred and the party responsible is liable can the conduct in question be legally recognized as a tort.
In the present case, MEXT collected declarations from individuals claiming to be victims and used them as the basis for asserting tortious conduct. However, statements from alleged victims alone are insufficient to establish a tort. The veracity of each claim, as well as whether the described incidents actually constitute compensable harm, must be independently verified.
Yet MEXT, lacking investigative and judicial authority, submitted these declarations without proper verification. Moreover, it has already been revealed that many of these statements included false or misleading claims. For example, as reported by journalist Masumi Fukuda in the April 2025 issue of the magazine Hanada (“The Crime of MEXT: The Full Story Behind the Fabricated ‘Unification Church Testimonies’”), there are cases in which a statement was fabricated and submitted by the son of an alleged victim—even though the person concerned had not requested any restitution.
In principle, donations made by believers during the period of their faith cannot be reclaimed simply because they later lost faith or left the religion. Based on this principle, many of the declarations collected by MEXT do not constitute torts and should not be treated as valid grounds for dissolution.
Nevertheless, the Tokyo District Court, upon receiving the petition from MEXT, accepted the victim declarations without any verification. In essence, the court simply tallied the number of declarations and the total amount of alleged damages, concluding that there were nearly 1,560 victims and over 20.4 billion yen in damages. Based on these figures, the court issued the dissolution order.
In doing so, the court not only included amounts determined by civil rulings but also included compensation paid as part of out-of-court settlements and agreements that did not involve legal proceedings. Alarmingly, the court even factored in so-called “unmanifested damages,” which have neither been formally claimed nor verified, thereby greatly exaggerating the scale of the alleged harm. This clearly runs counter to the Religious Corporations Act’s standard of requiring “significant” and “clearly recognized” harm.
When a case is settled in court, there is debate over whether the original wrongdoing should still be regarded as a tort. However, when a matter is resolved through private settlement, the legal relationship concerning the alleged tort is generally considered to have been extinguished. Including such cases in the damage total is therefore unjust. Moreover, the inclusion of “unmanifested damages” as part of the court’s reasoning is a highly questionable practice.
Can such a proceeding be regarded as a fair non-contentious judicial review? The dissolution order was clearly based on a preordained conclusion and a biased process that disregarded fairness under the law.
Dissolution Must Be Based on Present Grounds
The issues with the calculation of victims and the amount of damages are not the only concerns. The Family Federation was originally founded in South Korea in 1954 and later began its missionary work in Japan, becoming legally recognized as a religious corporation under the name “The Holy Spirit Association for the Unification of World Christianity” in 1964. In 2015, the organization changed its legal name to the current “Family Federation for World Peace and Unification.”
In its petition, MEXT claimed that from around 1980 (Showa 55) to around 2023 (Reiwa 5)—a span of approximately 43 years—the organization was responsible for causing harm to nearly 1,560 people, totaling over 20.4 billion yen in damages. The Tokyo District Court accepted this claim in full.
However, the legal nature of torts must be carefully considered. According to Article 724 of the Civil Code, the right to claim compensation for a tort expires after 20 years from the time the wrongful act occurred. This statute of limitations exists to ensure stability in civil life and prevent indefinite legal liability. Even if a past act was illegal, the law recognizes that prolonged inaction leads to the expiration of liability. This principle is a cornerstone of legal certainty in a society governed by the rule of law.
The figures submitted by MEXT and accepted by the Tokyo District Court entirely ignore this statute of limitations. If dissolution orders could be issued based on alleged torts stretching back decades, how many religious corporations in Japan could be subject to dissolution today?
Dissolution should be based strictly on present issues and current grounds. Otherwise, religious organizations with problematic pasts—no matter how much they have reformed—would forever remain under the threat of dissolution. This would create a state of perpetual insecurity for any such organization.
In the case of the Family Federation, the organization issued a “Compliance Declaration” in 2009 (Heisei 21), stating that it would refrain from using fear-based or spiritually coercive methods when soliciting donations and would ensure that no donations were excessive in relation to a believer’s financial situation. The organization made internal directives to avoid any donation practices that would be viewed as socially inappropriate. Since 2010 (Heisei 22), the Family Federation has been involved in only one court case in which it was found to have committed a tort. Clearly, the number of such cases has dramatically decreased. Therefore, it can be said that, at present, the organization does not meet the criteria for dissolution.
Nevertheless, the Tokyo District Court claimed that the organization had caused “unprecedented and extensive harm, and that the risk of similar harm occurring in the present cannot be disregarded,” and therefore concluded that it would be difficult to expect the organization to improve its behavior.
However, given the post-Compliance Declaration situation, it is baseless to assert that “a state in which the risk of similar harm remains to a non-negligible degree” still exists. The phrase “non-negligible degree” is highly subjective. Furthermore, the court stated that the Family Federation “had opportunities and occasions to implement fundamental measures to address the problem but failed to do so.” Yet, instead of clearly setting forth an expected standard in advance and offering guidance toward achieving it, the court suddenly investigated and found that the organization had not met an unannounced standard—then used that as justification for issuing a dissolution order.
If such reasoning is permitted, then in principle, any religious organization could be dissolved.
A Religious Corporation Is a Religious Association, Not Merely a Legal Entity
The dissolution order also reflects a problematic understanding of what constitutes a religious corporation. The court stated that “the dissolution order system for religious corporations merely concerns the legal personality granted by law, and its revocation applies only when retaining that personality becomes inappropriate. Any consequences resulting from the loss of this status are merely reflective benefits stemming from the possession of legal personality.”
This interpretation is mistaken.
A religious corporation embodies the collective right to religious association, which is an essential aspect of religious freedom. The legal personality of such a group is not merely a reflective benefit—it is an integral part of the community’s ability to function. For believers, the loss of legal personality translates into the loss of the environment in which they can freely practice their faith. It is therefore not a trivial consequence.
Even if the organization were to lose its legal status and have its assets seized, Article 131 of the Civil Execution Act would still, in principle, preserve worship facilities for the use of the religious community. Since the dissolution in this case was not due to criminal acts committed by the organization’s leaders but rather based solely on alleged civil wrongdoings, it is unlikely that these worship facilities could legally be taken away. Although the court’s ruling does not clearly state this interpretation, such a reading should be pursued if dissolution is finalized in the future.
Interestingly, even the court itself acknowledged—by citing a Supreme Court precedent—that “the dissolution order in and of itself does not entail any legal effect that prohibits or restricts religious acts by believers.”
There Was a Striking Lack of Caution Regarding This Dissolution Order
In the Mainichi Shimbun dated March 26, Professor Sayuri Saito of Keisen University expressed concern that, although a dissolution order is akin to a death sentence for a religious corporation, few voices advocated caution in the case of the Family Federation. She pointed out that even during the dissolution process against Aum Shinrikyo in 1995, there were calls for careful deliberation—yet this time, such caution was notably absent.
Freedom of religion and belief is based on the premise that even minority religious groups should be able to coexist within society. The current system of separation of religion and state is founded on this assumption. That so many voices readily supported the dissolution of the Family Federation in such a climate is deeply regrettable.
The turning point came with the 2022 shooting of former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Public sentiment shifted dramatically, and the resulting backlash against the Family Federation took on “a political tone.” The judiciary, which should have remained impartial, was swept up in this tide. This is less a reflection of individual judicial competence than of the overwhelming pressure created by a politically charged atmosphere.
Also on March 26, the Sekai Nippo newspaper reported that the Soka Gakkai declined to comment directly on the dissolution petition but stated: “From the standpoint of strictly observing freedom of religion, the exercise of public authority against religion should be carried out with the utmost caution.”
Soka Gakkai has effectively established a political party—Komeito—indicating that it does, in fact, participate actively in politics. Therefore, it bears a grave responsibility for how this issue unfolds going forward. Following the 2022 shooting incident, there was a surge in public opinion opposing any closeness between religious groups and political actors. Yet Soka Gakkai and Komeito remained silent, failing to assert that cooperation between religion and politics can be legitimate under the principle of religious freedom.
In the end, the Tokyo District Court issued a dissolution order based on an unconstitutional procedure, relying on unverified victim statements that, if applied broadly, could justify dissolution orders against many other religious organizations. This judgment is a serious stain on the religious history of Japan.
Komeito, given its public responsibility and the gravity of the matter, must not remain silent. It should take an active stance in response to this grave constitutional and religious issue.
Seishiro Sugihara
Born in Hiroshima Prefecture in 1941, Seishiro Sugihara earned his Bachelor of Arts in 1965 and Master of Arts in 1967 from the University of Tokyo’s Graduate School of Education. He served as a professor at Josai University and Musashino Women’s University (now Musashino University). Currently, he is the President of the Institute for International Historical Debate.
Sugihara has published extensively in the fields of Japanese educational philosophy, comparative education, the separation of religion and state, and modern diplomatic history.
His major works include:
- The Meaning and Essence of the New Basic Education Law
- Shinto, Buddhism, and the Separation of Religion and State in Japan — and Religious Education
- The Ideal Provision for the Separation of Religion and State and Constitutional Reform
